Foundations of normative decision theory
Event Information
Description
Expected utility (EU) theory is a standard theory about how to make rational decisions in the context of risk. The most interesting arguments for the foundational principles of EU theory arise in cases of decisions taken across time, e.g., the money pump argument. Arguments of this sort were explored by Peter Hammond and Edward McClennen, among others. This workshop brings together a range of philosophers working on these topics.
Attendance is free and everyone is welcome. To give us an idea about numbers, please order a free ticket if you are planning to come.
The timetable below may be subject to small changes.
Wednesday, 20 June
Location: The Mure Room, Merton College
10.00 – 11.30— Johanna Thoma (LSE) — Instrumental Rationality without Separability
11.30 – 12.00 — Break
12.00 – 13.30 — Gerard Rothfus (UC Irvine) — Evidence, Causality, and Sequential Choice
13.30 – 14.30 — Lunch
14.30 – 16.00 — Arif Ahmed (Cambridge) — Future discounting
16.00 – 16.30 — Break
16.30 – 18.00 — Chloé de Canson (LSE) — Salience and the Sure-Thing Principle
19.00 — Dinner
Thursday, 21 June
Location: The Colin Matthew Room, Faculty of Philosophy, Radcliffe Humanities
10.00 – 11.30— Johan Gustafsson (York) — The Dynamic Consistency Argument for the Independence Condition of Expected Utility Theory
11.30 – 12.00 — Break
12.00 – 13.30 — Ralf Bader (Oxford) — Incompleteness and dynamic inconsistency
13.30 – 14.30 — Lunch
14.30 – 16.00 — Roberto Fumagalli (KCL) — Rationality and the Acquisition of Intentions: Why Rational Choice Theory is not Self-Defeating
16.00 – 16.30 — Break
16.30 – 18.00 — Katie Steele (ANU) — Growing Awareness, Belief and Practical Rationality (joint work with H. Orri Stefansson)
The talks are 60 minutes long, followed by 30 minutes of Q&A.
We would like to thank Merton College, the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, the Aristotelian Society, the Mind Association, and the Analysis Trust for their generous support.
Organizers: Kacper Kowalczyk, Ralf Bader
If you have any questions, email: kacper.kowalczyk@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
