Parfit Memorial Lecture 2024 - Theron Pummer (in-person)

Parfit Memorial Lecture 2024 - Theron Pummer (in-person)

The Parfit Memorial Lecture 2024 will be delivered by Theron Pummer (University of St Andrews). Register to attend in-person.

By Global Priorities Institute

Date and time

Wed, 12 Jun 2024 16:30 - 18:30 GMT+1

Location

St Anne's College or online

56 Woodstock Road Oxford OX2 6HS United Kingdom

About this event

Please register using your institutional email address, if you have one.

The Parfit Memorial Lecture is an annual distinguished lecture series established by the Global Priorities Institute (GPI) in memory of Derek Parfit. The aim is to encourage research among academic philosophers on topics related to global priorities research - using evidence and reason to figure out the most effective ways to improve the world.

Speaker: Theron Pummer (University of St Andrews)

Title: Future Suffering and the Non-Identity Problem

Abstract: If we dramatically reduced our carbon emissions, the quality of life of future people would be much higher than it would be if we carried on with business as usual. Nonetheless, because adopting a widespread policy of reducing emissions would affect the timings of conceptions and thus the identities of who would come to exist, it is likely that after a century or so none of the particular people who would exist if we carried on as usual would exist if we instead dramatically reduced our emissions. Reducing emissions may therefore be better for no particular future person. Are we nonetheless morally required to reduce our emissions, and, if so, on what basis? This is one instance of the non-identity problem, made famous by Derek Parfit. Drawing upon the distinction between morally requiring reasons and morally justifying reasons, I provide a new solution to the non-identity problem. According to my solution, we can be morally required to ensure that the quality of life of future people is higher rather than lower insofar as this involves reducing future suffering (negative welfare). Indeed, we are often morally required to do this. We can be morally required to reduce future suffering in this way even when it is not better for any particular future person and even when future people would have lives worth living regardless of what we do. However, we are never morally required to ensure that the quality of life of future people is higher rather than lower insofar as this involves merely increasing future happiness (positive welfare). My solution to the non-identity problem captures the procreation asymmetry while avoiding implausible forms of antinatalism. It has important implications for global priority setting.

More information on the lecture can be found here.

Please use this registration form to attend in-person. To attend remotely, register here. The lecture will be followed by a drinks reception for in-person attendees.

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Organised by

The Global Priorities Institute is an interdisciplinary research centre at the University of Oxford.

Our aim is to conduct foundational research that informs the decision-making of individuals and institutions seeking to do as much good as possible. We prioritise topics which are important, neglected, and tractable, and use the tools of multiple disciplines, especially philosophy and economics, to explore the issues at stake.

More information on our research agenda can be found here.

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