Please join us for a research talk with Halfdan Lynge (University of the Witwatersrand):

How do political candidates choose from the menu of manipulation? When do they buy votes, when do they stuff the ballots boxes, and when do they opt out of electoral manipulation altogether? Most research has focused on the ‘blunter’ types of electoral manipulation. Less attention has been given to the ‘subtler’ types and the properties that differentiate them. This paper looks at one type of ‘subtle’ electoral manipulation: miscounting, meaning election officers who selectively reject ballots during the counting. It suggests that miscounting is characterised by low risks and high direct costs. On one hand, it is almost invisible, embedded in the sociocultural norms and practices surrounding elections in many non-democracies. On the other, it is expensive, requiring large amounts of patronage to co-opt election officers. This makes miscounting attractive only to incumbents who fear electoral defeat and have well-established clientelistic networks. The paper tests this argument against data from parliamentary elections in Ghana. Consistent with the argument, it finds that the effect of electoral uncertainty on miscounting is conditional. When the MPs do not have resources at their disposal, they choose other types of electoral manipulation or opt out of electoral manipulation altogether.

Halfdan Lynge is a Senior Lecturer at the Wits School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand (South Africa). His research in comparative politics and political economy broadly explores the effects of elections on public policy and spending. In addition, he has an interest in parliamentary oversight and its effect on fiscal policy. Halfdan holds a doctoral degree from the University of Oxford (United Kingdom) and master’s and bachelor’s degrees from the University of Copenhagen (Denmark). He spent more than five years with UNDP in Africa and Asia, including as the manager of several parliamentary development and political party strengthening projects. His last position was as Head of the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where he supervised a team of advisors to the UN Country Team. Halfdan started his career as a governance specialist, working with the National Assembly of Mozambique, and continues to work as a governance consultant. Recent assignments include a monograph for UNDP on political party regulation and oversight in the Pacific region, co-authored with Fernando Casal-Bertoa, and an evaluation of UNDP support to parliaments and political parties in West and Central Africa.

Speaker: Halfdan Lynge (University of the Witwatersrand)

Convenor: Fernando Casal Bertoa (University of Nottingham)

All welcome. This seminar will be held as a hybrid. Please indicate in your registration whether you wish to take part via our online platform or in person. The in-person event will take place in Monica Partridge D09 on the University Park Campus at the University of Nottingham.

Patronage distribution, co-optation, and invisible electoral manipulation