The aim of the workshop is to bring together philosophers of perception, metaphysicians, and epistemologists to debate issues surrounding the particularity of perception. Particularity refers to instances of properties, or specific objects or events (e.g., a sample of blue, my favourite watch, and today’s sunrise in Glasgow, respectively). It is most directly contrasted with generalities, notably including kinds of properties, objects and events (e.g., blue, Bulova watches, and sunrises, respectively). Although some mental states seem entirely general (e.g., the thought ‘Blue is a colour’), various mental states involve a complex interplay between particularities and generalities (e.g., the thought ‘this watch is blue’). Understanding the extent and sources of these particularities and generalities is a fundamental issue in philosophy, and perception is especially critical to our access to particularities. Perception grounds demonstrative reference, yields singular thoughts, and fixes the reference of singular terms. Moreover, perception provides us with knowledge of particulars in our environment and justifies singular thoughts about particulars. How does perception play these cognitive and epistemic roles in our lives? When we perceive our environment, we are perceptually related to particulars such as objects, events, and property-instances in that environment. What kind of mental state are we in when we are perceptually related to a particular?

A precise schedule of events is forthcoming.